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BOOK REVIEW
SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? TowARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR NATURAL

OBJECTS. By Christopher D. Stone.' Los Altos, California: William

Kaufman, Inc. 1974. Pp. xvii, 102. $6.95.
2
Reviewed by Tom R. Moore

A private citizen's inability to control the quality of his own and
his children's lives is a matter of serious, growing concern today. The
same mechanisms that government creates to serve its citizens often
frustrate the efforts of citizens to protect the public interest. 8 Too
often, the public's interest in the vigilant protection of the environment or in other substantial public rights is represented by officials too
isolated from citizen action and too close to the parties they are
supposed to control.4 Legal scholars have watched the continued frustration of citizens' efforts in Florida (and elsewhere) to obtain redress
of injuries to public interests in the environment. 5 Now Professor
Christopher D. Stone has offered an entirely new approach to the

question of standing to sue. Perhaps the frustration of citizen movements to protect environmental amenities can best be assuaged by an
affirmative answer to his question: "Should trees have standing?"
Whether one accepts or rejects the proposition that trees or other
inanimate objects should have legal standing in the courts of this land,
1. Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center.
2. Member, Florida Bar; Director of Environmental Law Division, Florida Audubon
Society.
3. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425
F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In this case Circuit Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger observed:
The Public Intervenors, who were performing a public service under the mandate
of this court, were entitled to a more hospitable reception in the performance of
that function. As we view the record the Examiner tended to impede the exploration of the very issues which we would reasonably expect the Commission itself
would have initiated; an ally was regarded as an opponent.
Id. at 548-49.
4. In Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 281 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, No. 44,402 (Fla. June 12, 1974), the district court noted that
[the] duty to abate [public] nuisances rested overly long in the bosom of the appointed officials, and relief was indeed ultimately never attained by the public or
anyone else. Moreover, with more than passing frequency, a public injury was created, encouraged or perpetuated by public officials themselves ....
Id. at 574. See also Comment, Standing on the Side of the Environment: A Statutory
Prescription for Citizen Participation, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 561 (1971).
5. See, e.g., Cornwell, From Whence Cometh Our Help? Conservationists' Search
for a Judicial Forum for Environmental Relief, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 451 (1971); Little,
New Attitudes About Legal Protection for Remains of Florida'sNatural Environment, 23
U. FLA. L. REv. 459 (1971).
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he must admit that the tremendous impact of Professor Stone's essay,
now in book form, undeniably is already an accomplished fact. Stone's
essay first appeared 6 while Sierra Club v. Morton 7 was pending in the
United States Supreme Court. Stone admittedly hoped to influence
the Court's consideration of the standing issues in that case, brought
to prevent the Disney development of the Mineral King Valley in Sequoia National Park. His success is evident; Justice Douglas, dissenting from that landmark decision, rewarded the Professor's efforts by
citing the essay after the statement: "Contemporary public concern for
protecting nature's ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral
of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own preservation."8
At the very least, one Justice (and perhaps three) sitting in the
Sierra Club case had no conceptual problem with an affirmative answer
to the question posed by the title of the essay. With only a four-man
majority in a seven-Justice decision, two swing votes still exist.
In this reviewer's opinion, the essay (the book is a combination of
the original essay and the full text of the majority and minority
opinions in Sierra Club v. Morton) merits the description given it by
Garrett Hardin in his foreward to the book; indeed, it "bids fair to
become a classic" (p. xii).
One must be impressed by Stone's thorough research and particularly by his rational discussion of his analogies. Stone recognizes and
discusses three serious conceptual and procedural problems that arise
if standing is granted to inanimate natural objects. First, the analogy
between trees and corporations or ships is not as persuasive as it first
appears. True, natural persons possess and own natural objects, just
as they do corporations and ships. Private ownership of either a corporate entity or a ship, however, is quite different from ownership of a
natural object. Dissolution of a corporation or destruction of a ship
rarely, if ever, affects broad public interests that conflict with the interests of the owners. In contrast, destruction of natural objects is often
of great concern to many persons other than owners. Recognition
of legal status that permits a corporation or ship to sue or to be sued
in its own name is for the benefit of its owners; it limits liabilities and
simplifies legal procedures that otherwise would involve numerous
persons (the owners). On the other hand, recognition of a similar
legal status for inanimate natural objects would benefit those persons
whose interests oppose those of the natural objects' owners. If stand6. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects,
45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450 (1972).
7. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
8. Id. at 741-42.
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ing to sue is granted to natural objects in their own right, then one
must acknowledge that this is not merely an extension of present legal
theories. It is a very different proposition. Stone seems to agree, but
he suggests that the new approach is nevertheless no more revolutionary
than the original recognition of the corporation as a legal entity.
Secondly, vesting standing in a natural object presumes that the
courts must strike a balance between the object's interests and rights
and the human interests or rights pertaining to the object. This is
desirable according to Stone, but it seems inconsistent with the nature
of adversary proceeding in our courts (even with respect to ships and
corporations). In any litigation concerning the natural object, it is
really competing human interests that are balanced; Stone, however,
seeks protection of the object. Under the guardianship approach suggested by Stone, the duty would still devolve upon the guardian of the
natural object to describe the benefits to the object in terms of ultimate
benefits to human interests in protecting the object. If this is so, then
one returns full circle to the criteria for standing, because the most
appropriate "guardian" is that party (group or individual) who can
show injury in fact and can assure the judiciary that he can adequately
represent in an adversary fashion the interests asserted.9 Persons (or
groups) with such human interests would be the only proper guardians
of natural objects. Thus, as a practical matter, the guardians' interests
would be balanced against other human interests (for example, the
owners' interest in turning a profit by using the natural object in a
manner that also benefits the public).
The third problem Stone recognizes is that granting standing to
natural objects does not assure the protection of public rights and
interests in using and enjoying those objects. The frustrated effort
9. At the outset of its opinion in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), the
United States Supreme Court restated the fundamental requirements for standing to
sue to be:
Whether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to
obtain judicial resolution of that controversy is what has traditionally been referred to as the question of standing to sue.... [T]he question of standing depends
upon whether the party has alleged such a "personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy," Baker v. Car-, 369 U.S. 186, 204, as to ensure that "the dispute sought
to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of judicial resolution." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101.
405 U.S. at 731-32.
Within this over-simplified definition of a citizen's standing to sue when he relies
upon no federal statute, there is agreement that three essential conditions must be
satisfied: (1) a genuine dispute must exist; (2) an adversary proceeding must be assured;
and (3) the court must be convinced that the party whose standing is challenged will
adequately represent the interests he asserts. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun called these
requirements the "customary criteria" for standing. 405 U.S. at 758.
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of citizens to protect public rights in the recent Save Sand Key case"
offers a good example of this. In Save Sand Key the Florida Supreme
Court, ignoring the district court's scholarly criticism and rejection of
the "special injury" rule," threw the citizens out of court in deference
to that old, arguably obsolete doctrine.
Conferring standing on the dry sand beach itself (Sand Key) would
accomplish nothing in terms of assuring the availability of a litigant
to protect the public right to use the beach. The citizens' group in
the Save Sand Key case tried to protect and confirm an existing public
right to use the dry sand area. The beach itself remains, for the most
part, unchanged. Sand Key, as a potential litigant, has no interest in
assuring that the pleasure it brings to humans reaches not only its
private owners but also the general public that has long enjoyed it (in
fact, the private property owners no doubt assert that they will take
better care of the beach than the messy, uncaring public would).
Stone's proposition that inanimate natural objects should have
legal rights deserves the serious consideration given to it by Justice
Douglas in Sierra Club. Lawyers, judges and environmentalists in
particular will find Stone's book well worth reading and pondering.
In the not-so-distant future, the words of Justice Blackmun's dissent
in Sierra Club may reappear in a judicial opinion on the challenge by
an inanimate natural object to an infringement of "its" rights: "Are
we to be rendered helpless to consider and evaluate allegations and
challenges of this kind because of procedural limitations rooted in
traditional concepts of standing?"'12 Recognition of the rights of the
object itself, presented in an adversary fashion by its guardian, may
well be superior to our present traditional approaches to standing and
to the "rightslessness" of natural objects. If our legal system fails to
evolve some new approach, then the environment upon which humankind depends for existence may be so deleteriously affected that there
will be no need for a legal system.

10. United States Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., No. 44,402 (Fla. June 12, 1974).
11. Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 281 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, No. 44,402 (Fla. June 12, 1974).
12. 405 U.S. at 759.

